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The so-called FRITALUX/FINEBEL negotiations took place from the middle 
of 1949 until the early Spring of 1950 and involved France, Italy and the 
Benelux nations. What they were supposed to be primarily about depends 
really upon from which of the two extremes the situation is viewed. For the 
French, the major goal was the creation of a 'Little Europe' payments union 
involving liberalization of capital and flexible exchange rates. As far as 
.the Dutch were concerned the issues at stake were the freeing of trade and 
the position of West Germany in an integrated Europe. As a result what the 
various parties ended up discussing was nothing less than the future order 
of post-war Europe. The negotiations eventually failed partly because there 
were two agendas, and partly because those agendas were irreconcilable in 
the political and economic climate of the time, though an important back­
ground factor throughout were shifts in the American perception of what they 
hoped to achieve. Nonetheless, in economic terms it could be argued that the 
issues raised in the FRITALUX/FINEBEL negotiations offered a far more radi­
cal blue-print for the future of Europe than the Schuman Plan which so 
rapidly eclipsed them.
This study of an almost forgotten incident along the path towards 
European integration has been based on the available archive material of the 
two principal protagonists —  France and the Netherlands —  together with 




































































































































































































The Background of French-Ita]ian-Benelux Cooperation 
The Petsche Plan, Apri1-September 1949
FRITALUX: The emergence of two visions, October-November 1949
The FRITALUX Negotiations, November-December 1949





































































































T  D a a U
O  •  U C U 1 1





























American Secretary of State
Director of the Economics Section of the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director of the Belgian National Bank
Chief of the Economic Cooperation Service in the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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President of the Dutch National Bank
Government Adviser to Dutch Ministry of Finance
Dutch Minister of Finance
Dutch Minister for Agriculture
Secretary General of the OEEC
Director of the French Planning Commissariat
French Minister of Finance
Adviser in Dutch Ministry of Finance
French Minister of Public Health and Population
French Minister of Foreign Affairs
Director General in the Belgian Ministry of
Foreign Trade
President of Council of OEEC, President of 
Council of Benelux
Director General of the Foreign Economic Policy
Section in the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs
Attaché in the Belgian National Bank
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In 1945 Europe had emerged from the war with a significant proportion of 
its productive capacity and social overhead capita] in ruins, with a chronic 
need for imports of both capita] and consumer goods and with an equally 
chronic shortage of hard currency with which to pay for them. This manifested 
itself in a degree of protectionism and active trade discrimination which 
dwarfed even that of the 1930s. The intention of Marshall Aid, announced in 
1947, was to help remove one of the direct causes of this immediate situation, 
namely the dollar shortage, but it was hoped not only to promote a relaxation 
of the extreme protectionist measures associated with the demands of 
reconstruction but also to roll back a rising tide of protectionism which had 
characterized European history (and that of the USA for that matter) since the 
late 19th century. It was hoped that by modelling itself on the successful 
American experience, Europe would come to enjoy the same benefits of economies 
of scale, economic prosperity and democracy commonly attributed to the United 
States and, 'perhaps equally importantly, that communist influence in a number 
of Western European states would recede. The linking of dollar aid to Europe 
with progress towards the attainment of closer economic cooperation within 
Europe did indeed lead to a number of significant successes (1) but it could 
be argued that this progress had barely succeeded in restoring the situation 
to one similar to what had prevailed in the 1930s, and in certain areas not 
even that.
The Schuman Plan which eventually led to the formation of a European Coal 
and Steel Community embracing six European nations is justifiably seen as 
having been a historic breakthrough moving the states concerned into new 




























































































history has been virtually elevated to the realms of mythology, it is impor­
tant to realise how limited the economic content actually was embracing as it 
did only two, admittedly important, sectors of the economy —  coal and steel 
(2). It is often forgotten that more far-reaching ideas had been discussed in 
these years which, had they succeeded, would have produced a more radical (and 
early) change in the European economy. This was the case with the so-called 
FRITALUX/FINEBEL negotiations involving France, Italy and the Benelux 
countries. They eventually failed to produce any concrete results partly 
because the parties in the negotiations were often aiming at completely dif­
ferent goals and partly because those different goals were irreconcilable in 
the political and economic climate at the time. In the light of the history of 
these- negotiations, which eventually fizzled out in the early spring of 1950, 
it is possible to view the Schuman Plan as representing the lowest common 
denominator (with an admittedly inspired gesture towards supranational ism) 
than as a bold economic blue-print for the future of Europe.
These negotiations form the subject of this paper which has been based on 
the available archive material of two of the participating countries —  France 
and the Netherlands. These two countries were chosen in the first instance 
because, as Schuman remarked in the context of conversations with Stikker, 
they represented the poles of the debate(3). An analysis of their respective 




























































































THE BACKGROUND OF FRENCII-ITALIAN-BENELUX COOPERATION
It was not surprising that the French should have chosen to direct their 
initiative for closer- economic cooperation towards the Benelux countries and 
Italy. France and the Benelux partners had been talking together on the sub­
ject on and off since even before the War was over. Indeed, the FRITALUX 
proposals represented no less than the fourth direct approach to this end in 
almost as many years. Moreover, Italy and France had been locked in detailed 
negotiations for at least fifteen months prior to the launching of the 
FRITALUX talks.
Within both the Resistance movements and the governments-]'n-exi le the 
idea of creating a wider European market had had a wide following. The first 
concrete step in this direction was the customs union treaty signed by the 
governments-in-exile of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in September 
1944 committing the governments to implementing the customs union as soon as 
the three countries were liberated and then moving quickly on to the creation 
of a full economic union (4). Proposals which included France in these 
developments were drawn up in the Quai d'Orsay and approved by de Gaulle in 
December 1944 (5). These ideas found theii- concrete expression in the Accord 
Economique de Consultation Mutuelle signed by the four governments in April 
1945. The agreement was much less far-reaching than the Benelux treaty insofar 
as it committed the governments only to the coordination of policies in a 
number of economic areas (fiscal policy, prices, tariffs, quotas, new in­
dustries etc.) (6). Now, the Netherlands were not finally liberated until May




























































































domestic (and colonial) problems to accord either of these agreements a par­
ticularly high priority. By January 1946, however, the Belgians were clearly 
showing signs of impatience at the complete lack of progress towards im­
plementing the Benelux customs union and backed this up by checking the vital 
flow of credit which had, been helping to sustain the Dutch reconstruction 
policy. It was exactly at this moment that Alphand announced that what the 
French wanted from the rest was no less than a commitment to work towards a 
full economic union embracing the four economies. The Dutch government viewed 
this cumulative pressure with something akin to horror —  they could no longer 
afford to delay positive action on the Benelux treaty in case the Belgians 
considered it a dead-letter and went ahead alone with the French but neither 
did they want to enter a customs union involving France. The reasons for this 
latter stance were never stated clearly but economically it could have lain in 
the fact that French-Dutch trade had been historically relatively unimportant 
and that, in agreeing to the French proposals, the Dutch felt they would lose 
the freedom of initiative in trying to open up two more important markets - 
those of the United Kingdom and Germany. The result of Alphand*s announcement 
and the diplomatic pressure over the subsequent months was to accelerate the 
progress within Benelux (where agreement for implementing the customs union 
was announced in April 1946) but as far as the French initiative itself was 
concerned, the only achievement was to have the entire question made the 
subject of study by groups of experts. It was still being studied when the 
Accord was eventually wound up in 1948 (7).
The announcement of the Marshall Plan, couched as it was in terms of the 
need to foster a greater degree of European cooperation provided a further 
opportunity for the French to launch an initiative for the formation of a 




























































































the French government issued a formal note which declared that "it; is ready to 
enter into negotiations with all European governments ... who wish to enter a 
customs union with France and whose national economies are capable of being 
combined with the French economy in such a way as to make a viable unit ..." 
(8). Although the invitation, at first sight, appeared an open one it had been 
preceded by French diplomatic approaches involving the UK, Benelux and Italy 
as a group (9) and by separate discussions wi th) the Belgians which seemed to 
have swayed at least a part of the Belgian negotiating team (10). In the event 
Benelux unity was successfully restored and a joint UK-Benelux motion was 
accepted which had the effect of shunting the French proposals into an OEEC 
study group (the second time this tactic had been used for stalling progress 
without anyone being forced into actually saying 'no'!).
Of the OEEC countries, only Italy was prepared to accept the French 
proposals on a bilateral basis. A mixed commission of officials from both 
countries was set up to discuss the "timeliness of establishing a customs 
union" which just before Christmas 1947 completed its report. In what in the 
end proved an over-optimistic conclusion it stated that "in no field did it 
discover fundamental obstacles or even serious difficulties to the formation 
of such a union" (11).
Armed with the findings of this report in January 1948 the French once 
again attempted to interest the Benelux partners in joining what had now 
become a joint Franco-Italian initiative. The two governments had agreed that 
a customs union by stages was indeed possible and it was suggested that a 
joint committee involving Benelux, under the possible chairmanship of 
Spierenburg, should examine, without prejudice, the difficulties and ad­
vantages of a larger customs union involving the five countries (12). At a 




























































































the need to include the UK and that to go ahead with the French proposals at 
that stage would undoubtedly upset the UK. On the other hand the Belgians 
stressed the need to appear as conciliatory as possible (13). The formal reply 
endorsed the French logic that a larger customs union was in the economic 
interests of Europe but at the same time observed that the possibility of an 
even larger union than the French were proposing was already being discussed 
by the study group within the OEEC. If that failed, then the Benelux govern­
ments would have no objections to helping to realize a more limited regional 
one (14 ).
Meanwhile the French and Italian governments had decided to press on with 
their joint venture and created a new mixed commission to define a plan and 
programme for the actual realization of the customs union. It completed its 
report almost exactly a year later. Central to its conclusions was the finding 
that a full tariff union could be formed within twelve months and that a full 
economic union was feasible five years after that. A treaty embodying the 
first intention and endorsing the desirability of the second was signed in 
March 1949 but when the treaty was submitted by the French government to the 
Conseil Economique for an opinion it was rejected, albeit by only a small 
majority. The government drew the obvious conclusions from this defeat and did 
not even submit the treaty for parliamentary ratification. The Italian govern­
ment, which had been waiting to see reaction to the treaty in France, now also 
followed suit and allowed the matter to slide (15).
This dramatic failure did not mean that the French had abandoned the goal 
of economic integration but it may have forced them to alter their strategy to 
achieve this objective. The fact that it was opposition to the move to 
eliminate customs barriers first which killed the treaty should have made it 




























































































doomed to failure. It is this realization which may explain the form which the 
new initiative took.
THE PETSCHE PLAN, APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1949
Within a month of the abandonment of the Franco-Italian customs union 
project, the French were engaged in preparing a new initiative which they 
hoped would be successful in interesting not only Italy but the Benelux 
countries as well. The ultimate aim of the scheme was the removal of quantita­
tive restrictions on the movement of capital and labour within the group and 
(remembering the lessons of the failed customs union) on trade but only in­
sofar as it was considered possible given the specific sectoral interests of 
the individual countries. However it was recognized that the chances of suc­
cess were not great unless a way were found to minimize the dislocation in the 
domestic economies which this liberalization could be expected to produce. The 
way in which this was to be achieved was through the mechanism of fluctuating 
exchange raiTes which would reflect imbalances on trade and payments movements 
within the group (16). When the outlines of the scheme, referred to as the 
Petsche Plan, were tentatively submitted to the Americans they received a 
surprisingly warm welcome. Harriman claimed that many within the ECA were 
becoming disenchanted with the OEEC's record in promoting integration and that 
these were the lines along which the USA envisaged achieving a closer degree 
of European economic cooperation. He did, however, question whether the size 
of the group might not be too small and suggested that later it should be 
expanded to include Scandinavia and West Germany (17).
American encouragement of the scheme gave the impetus to continue working 




























































































achievement of closer economic integration in Europe. This link was given 
extra force when in the summer of 1949 the idea was discussed in the USA of 
reducing the amount of aid available for individual economies and assigning it 
to a special fund designed to support regional integration schemes. The 
'prize', when this was eventually decided was $150 million. Nevertheless the 
proposals as they stood were not without danger for the French economy. Given 
the multiple exchange rate structure which the French maintained, it was 
feared that the liberalization of trade might encourage the deflection of 
trade to take advantage of the differential exchange rates for imports and 
exports. Thus it was possible that Belgium and Italy might purchase imports 
from the dollar and sterling areas in France and re-export them to their own 
countries causing a drain on French foreign exchange reserves. This drain 
would be reinforced by French exporters selling their exports via other mem­
bers in the group. A further complication lay in the obligation to respect the 
cross rate in commercial operations between the dollar and sterling. Since the 
pound was so obviously overvalued vis-à-vis the dollar, an adjustment to 
single external exchange rates would tend to deflect French exports from the 
dollar area to the sterling area. Finally, the entire scheme depended on the 
countries concerned following broadly similar monetary policies (18). The 
situation in Belgium also raised a further crop of problems. If exchange rates 
were to be allowed to float, the French franc would almost certainly 
depreciate against the Belgian franc which, it was feared, would lead to a 
reduction in Belgian exports to France and a corresponding fall in Belgian 
employment levels. Moreover Belgium had no restrictions on capital movements 
at all which meant that if other countries now removed their own restrictions 
on capital movements into Belgium, there would be a leakage of capital out of 




























































































consulted at all, though how anyone expected Belgium to be able to participate 
in the scheme without the Netherlands and without breaking up Benelux is 
unclear. As a result of all these considerations, the French plans which had 
seemed to be so simple and elegant in their first conception began to show all
the hallmarks of compromise. By August 1949 the main outlines of the plan
agreed by Belgium, France and Italy were as follows:
- exchange rates between the currencies of the group would be allowed to 
reflect changes in supply and demand for the currencies (i.e., would 
float) but that banks would intervene to iron out short-term 
fluctuations
- all flows of goods and capital among the three were to be conducted at 
the free rate of exchange with one exception. Between France and 
Belgium commercial transactions were to be conducted at a rate mid-way 
between the free intra-group rate and the fixed franc:dollar rate (this 
was clearly designed to protect Belgian exports to France)
- between Italy and France the pace of liberalization of payments and the
removal of quotas on trade was to move at a faster pace than was en­
visaged for similar liberalizations between each of these and Belgium 
(this, presumably because Belgium, with a lower prevailing tariff level 
than either, would be disadvantaged by an equality of treatment in this 
area)
- restrictions on capital movements between the three were to be removed 
as soon as possible but the instruments of control were to remain and




























































































- the governments agreed to consult each other as often as necessary to
discuss difficulties arising for any one of them as a result of im­
plementing the scheme (20).
It was at this point that the Dutch were first officially informed of 
what was going on and were invited to discuss the proposals with the rest of
the group in Washington on September 15th (the location and timing being
determined by the fact that the European foreign and finance ministers would 
be there to discuss arrangements surrounding NATO). So far research in the 
archives has failed to uncover an account of that meeting but it could not 
have been a pleasant one. The Dutch memorandum, having got the usual 
platitudes out of the way (21), went on to pour scepticism on the measures 
suggested. Among the most telling of their arguments was the fact that if 
balance of payments equilibrium, bilaterally within the group, was to be 
achieved by changes in the exchange rate, it would lead to a pattern of disor­
derly cross rates which, regardless of the other problems this would entail, 
was contrary to the principles of the IMF. They also felt that the abolition 
of capital controls would accentuate any disequilibrium existing in current 
account balances by permitting movements of speculative capital, in the short 
term, and by allowing unchecked a movement of longer term capital from weaker 
to stronger economies. If there was a way forward, it was argued, it should 
concentrate first on the removal of foreign exchange control on movements of 
goods and services (and not on capital) and that this, in turn, should take 
place by expanding the arrangements within the OEEC (22). To the British, the 
Dutch confided a further string of objections. They felt they could not coun­
tenance entering a group in which it would be in persistent deficit if it were 
forced to pay out gold and hard currency reserves (23) nor, given this situa­




























































































which were their largest markets. Furthermore, if the Belgians went ahead, 
without providing better safeguards for the Netherlands, it could spell the 
end of Benelux (24). That, as far as the Dutch were concerned, was clearly 
that, though they did allow their experts to continue talking with the others. 
Together they managed to produce a report to which, however, it would have 
been impossible for the Dutch government to have agreed (25).
FRITALUX: THE EMERGENCE OF TWO VISIONS, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1949
The context within which the French plans were to operate changed rapidly 
in the weeks that followed. Firstly the British devaluation and the hasty 
realignment of other European currencies promised to ease the dollar problem 
generally and, more specifically, it removed the problem of maintaining or­
derly cross rates which the overvaluation of sterling would have caused in any 
regional system in which exchange rates would float. If the French still 
wanted to persist with this part of the scheme, the sterling devaluation made 
it much easier to achieve. Secondly, the difficulties in the Benelux nego­
tiations had been resolved: the final obstacles to the 'Pre-Union' treaty were 
removed at the end of September and the treaty itself was signed the following 
month. Whereas, in September, van Zeeland had agreed to continue talking with 
the French and Italians alone, the Belgians now insisted that further par­
ticipation in discussions was conditional upon an invitation being extended to 
the Netherlands (26). Finally the Americans had announced the creation of a 
special reserve fund from the Marshall Aid allocation for 1950/51 which would 
be available for supporting integration schemes in Europe and rumours were 
beginning to circulate that the eventual size of the total dollar aid would be 




























































































economies. It was against this background that the various delegates met in 
Paris for the Executive Committee meeting of the OEEC in October 1949.
At the start of the meeting the ECA announced the decision to create a 
$150 million reserve fund. Although it was not discussed formally, informally 
the Americans found themselves besieged by national delegations anxious to 
impress —  the Scandinavians with their customs union plan, Benelux with the 
newly signed pre-Union treaty (the Americans appeared to have been favourably 
impressed but argued that Belgium had enough dollars already) ... and Alphand, 
with the Petsche Plan. On learning that the Americans were sympathetic towards 
the French proposals, Spierenburg and Snoy sought a meeting with Alphand at 
which he outlined the revised French scheme:
- free movement of capital within the group was to brought about, though 
under certain conditions some control would be permitted (this was 
unchanged)
- in the removal of trade barriers the group had to move further than the 
OEEC (this in response to the likely liberalization developments in the 
OEEC)
- the countries would accept a system of fluctuating exchange rates but 
(and this was new) the degree of fluctuation would be limited and 
cross-rates would be maintained
- the ECA would make available support from the reserve fund.
In the informal talks that followed, Spierenburg and Snoy expressed the 
desire that Britain be included in the talks. If Britain did not wish to join, 
it was for its government to decide but that decision should not be an­




























































































floating exchange rates and expressed the view that the liberalization of 
commercial transactions should take precedence over the freeing of capital 
(which should only be liberated insofar as it concerned investment capital). 
Finally, he argued, the problem with the group as it stood was the imbalances 
in payment flows, but since France had a deficit with the sterling area and 
the Netherlands a surplus, the inclusion of the UK would increase the multi­
lateralization of payments movements. Alphand was non-committal and suggested 
that the Belgians and the Dutch should prepare their own proposals for dis­
cussion at a meeting which he hoped would be called once a new French cabinet 
had been formed.
The desire to include Britain, however, was not without difficulties as 
Spierenburg discovered when he talked with Hall-Patch afterwards. He made it 
quite plain that Commonwealth commitments would preclude 100 per cent British 
participation in such a group but that as long as it did not discriminate 
against Britain, he doubted whether the government would object to its 
formation. This was not the answer Spierenburg particularly wanted. As he 
argued to cabinet, the only way to stall the French plans was either to in­
clude Britain or to have it object to the group. If it did neither, then 
pressure from the pro-French lobby in Belgium and pressure from the Americans 
could make it difficult for the Dutch to avoid being forced into 
participation. It was essential that the Dutch present early counter-proposals 
which, he suggested, should take the following form:
- the members of the group undertake to maintain 'monetary stability'
- trade barriers be gradually removed with certain exception in the case 



























































































- a limit be placed on the gold coverage of payments deficits; in par­
ticular France should be prepared to accept sterling in exchange for 
its payments surpluses with Benelux
- the group should strive for maximum transferability of their own cur­
rencies, and maximum freedom for invisibles
- the movement of investment capital only should be freed
- tariff barriers on mutual trade should be reduced (27).
If the Netherlands wanted to avoid being dragged into a small regional 
gx'oup, they had two alternatives: either to work at achieving a large regional 
group or to hope for quick success within the OEEC. The Hoffman speech made to 
the OEEC on October 30th confirmed their most pessimistic fears that Marshall 
Aid would not continue at all unless some spectacular action took place in the 
area of European integration and the fact that Hoffman not only opened the 
door to the formation of small groups but seemed positively to encourage them 
(28) was a further blow to Dutch hopes. In the meetings that followed Stikker 
attempted to push the Council of the OEEC towards elimination of protectionist 
tariffs and the introduction of a system of transferability of European cur­
rencies but with no success. Both the French and the Belgians made strong 
speeches in favour of the regional group option. Even the British supported a 
continental European block arguing that in the Empire and the sterling area it 
already had the largest free trade area in the world. Hirschfeld warned 
cabinet that they could expect an official invitation from the French very 
soon. The Council wanted all schemes for integration submitted by December 
15th (29).
The Quai d'Orsay taking the OEEC meeting and resolution as direct support




























































































Italy being referred to as 'Fritalu.x', now proceeded to draw up a more 
detailed set of proposals than those discussed hitherto. These proposals now 
incorporated many of the general ideas which had been discussed within French 
Cabinet committees for some time such as coordination of investment and state- 
sponsored industrial agreements. The group was to be open to any member of 
OEEC and the participation of West Germany in particular was to be discussed 
explicitly. Britain was to be kept informed since despite Cripp's rejection of 
the invitation the French still hoped that Britain might join at a later date.
In their proposals drawn up by November 14th the French recommended that:
- the movements of goods and services should be liberalized as soon as 
possible and at a faster rate than within OEEC but permitting some 
exceptions (this was seen as a way of reducing prices through 
specialization)
- exchange controls should be removed more gradually (it was feared that 
rapid removal would cause unemployment in certain sectors)
- budge£ary and credit policies should be harmonized
- discriminatory practices such as subsidies and double-pricing should be 
eliminated
- investment should be coordinated by governments or, in the case of 
private investment, through government sponsored industrial agreements 
(it was stressed that this would conform to chapter five of the Havana 
Charter)
- an investment bank should be set up to promote specialization and ease 
the problems caused by the disappearance of certain industries
- a similar system should be set up for agriculture if quantitative




























































































- a separate institutional structure should be set up. This would take 
the form of a general council presided over by the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and grouping together a financial committee composed of minis­
ters of finance and governors of national banks and an economic 
committee composed of the relevant economics ministries, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and in the French case the Commissariat au Plan
- exchange rates between the four currencies should float in order to
reflect changes in the free movement of trade and payments (based on
IMF approval and with provision for central bank intervention to sup­
port its own currency)
- all restrictions on the import of banknotes should be lifted although 
some limits should be enforced on the export of notes
- capital movements among member countries should be unhindered (although
the instruments of control were to remain and be used if necessary). 
Due to Belgium's net creditor status there was to be a transitional 
period in which Belgian capital could flow freely within the group but 
the movement of capital into Belgium could be restricted.
Since OEEC had agreed that the proposals for any regional group should be
submitted for its approval by 15 December 1949, the French report pointed out 
the urgent need for action. It also rejected the earlier practice of inviting 
counter-proposals from other members in view of the lack of time. To win the 
Dutch support the French government mentioned the advantage of including West 
Germany in the group since it would provide markets especially for agricul­




























































































emphasized the need for the group to condemn restrictive practices and car­
tels, and to consider itself as a transition towards free multilateral trade 
on a global scale (30).
Whilst waiting for the French report to arrive, the Dutch cabinet began 
to prepare its own set of counter-proposals. The basis for their deliberations 
was formed by a note prepared by Holtrop, President of the central bank. It 
was not exactly the most useful document for this purpose since it was 
directed largely towards an analysis of a group of ten or more countries 
(which the Dutch were likely to get but were trying to avoid) rather than a 
group of five countries (which the Dutch were trying to avoid but were likely 
to get). Besides, most of the statistical information was based on the pre­
devaluation period, was impossible to disaggregate so as to be applicable to 
different permutations of countries and made no estimates of the likely impact 
of any liberalization measures in the offing. As far as it was relevant for 
the impending Fritalux talks, it pointed out that the smaller the group, the 
more likely it would be that one country within the group would be in a 
serious deficit position within the group even though it might be in surplus 
outside it. This would involve it either reducing its reserves (unless the 
surplus was in a currency which the rest would accept) or adopting deflation­
ary measures or allowing its intra-group exchange rate to alter. The latter 
two options would restore its equilibrium within the group but in the first 
case it might be adopting growth restrictive measures which need not neces­
sarily be warranted by its overall position whilst in the second it would lead 
to, equally unnecessary, trade deviation. Holtrop's figures showed that even 
in a group including all the OEEC countries except Austria, Greece and Turkey, 
without the UK the Netherlands would move from a surplus to a deficit 
position. If, however, UK participation was not possible then the inclusion of 




























































































from the sterling area and towards West Germany. Without West Germany, this 
option would not be possible (31). Holtrop's report did not exactly contribute 
to a sharply focussed discussion within cabinet but the lines of a policy 
began to emerge. If, as everyone now seemed to accept, the UK would not par­
ticipate then West German involvement was essential but, as van den Brink 
considered, this would present French industry and agriculture with problems 
and this, in turn, would slow down the rate of trade liberalization in the 
group. He was not prepared to sanction a loss of gold or hard currency to 
cover intra-group deficits and Lieftinck was equally unwilling to sacrifice 
control over domestic economic policy for the same ends (32).
When the French proposals arrived Hirschfeld drew up a report which 
embodied most of the points raised in the cabinet discussion as well as many 
of Spierenburg's earlier proposals (see p. 15-6):
- the possibilities for cooperation should be discussed between the 
governments of France, Benelux, Italy and West Germany and an effort 
should be made to involve the UK (the French wanted to make the inclu­
sion of West Germany a subject for discussion in its own right);
- 75 per cent of quantitative restrictions on intra-group trade were to 
be removed by January 1st 1951 and 100 per cent by July 1st 1951, this 
removal was to take place progressively and in equal measure in the 
product groups agriculture, raw materials and end products (the French 
report had no timetable);
- tariff barriers were to be reduced to a level to enable competition 





























































































exceptions in the process of trade liberalization could be considered 
in the case of infant industries, industries needing protection and if 
the multilateral balance in the group were seriously endangered (no 
different from the French);
members should keep their drawing rights and conditional aid even after 
the end of the year for which they were granted and arrangements should 
be discussed which would allow monetary cooperation to continue even 
after Marshall Aid had ended (this point was not mentioned in the 
French report);
all exchange controls governing payments for goods should be abolished 
and a start made on the liberalization of services and capital (the 
French suggested liberalizing the lot; in fact by the time the 
Hirschfeld memorandum had finished making exceptions for capital move­
ments, the Dutch position was virtually synonymous with rejecting it); 
the movement of bank notes between countries was to be freed (this 
agreed essentially with the French);
the countries were to move towards a greater degree of multilateraliza­
tion of payments (this, again, agreed with the French though the Dutch 
proposals were worked out in much more detail);
in certain industrial sectors it might be necessary to coordinate 
investment through means of industrial agreements under government 
control (the detailed French proposals for accomplishing this were 
ignored);
in agriculture the object must be to increase production through 
rationalization and specialization which in turn required the complete 
removal of restrictions and the establishment of reasonable prices




























































































import and export policy should be agreed (this was much stronger than 
the French proposals).
The report, significantly, made no mention of the French proposals for 
the establishment of an investment bank, the detailed institutional arrange­
ments or flexible exchange rates (33). With only some cosmetic refinements, 
the economic committee of cabinet accepted the report unanimously (34) though, 
as much for tactical reasons as any other, the final memorandum did pick up 
positively the French idea that the group should have its own institutions 
(35).
With the talks scheduled to start in less than a week, the Dutch began to 
canvas for support. The most obvious starting place was with the other members 
of Benelux. When the Dutch memorandum was discussed with van Zeeland and Bech, 
the Belgians appeared to be in broad agreement with its outlines but they 
could not commit themselves, as the Dutch had wanted, to presenting it as a 
Benelux initiative without having discussed it first in cabinet. In particular 
van Zeeland did not want to force the French into a difficult position by 
endorsing "such a positive memorandum" (36).
Next on the list were the Americans. Their reply arrived on the day the 
negotiations opened but although it welcomed the Dutch memorandum as a basis 
for discussion, it felt that the proposals as they stood failed to put suffi­
cient pressure on deficit nations to take corrective action. The ECA fear, of 
course, was that any dollar fund would be rapidly exhausted if there were no 
obligation on deficit nations to either deflate or to adjust the exchange 
rate. On the question of UK participation, there was sympathy for the Dutch 




























































































quickly and that Britain could possibly join with some form of associate 
status later (37).
Finally, Beyen writing in his capacity as an executive director of the 
IMF, wrote a scathing memorandum attacking the French ideas for floating 
exchange rates which he saw as flouting the fundamental principles upon which 
the whole Bretton Woods system had been constructed. These were that the 
international division of labour should be based on a comparison of relative 
costs brought about by competitive trading which was only possible if cur­
rencies were freely convertible at stable exchange rates. The French 
justification for floating exchange rates was that in the world as it was it 
was not possible to maintain stable exchange rates without exchange control. 
Therefore if exchange controls were to be abolished the exchange rate had to 
make the necessary adjustments rather than force changes in domestic policies. 
While the IMF recognized that no provision had been made for the post-war 
phenomenon of the chronic disequilibrium caused by the dollar gap, they felt 
that the reasons why European countries could not afford to lift exchange and 
trade restrictions were more related to their domestic policies than to their 
exchange rate. And by refusing to face up to the decision of finding the right 
level of investment and the right way of financing import surpluses caused by 
such investment they were, through inflation and fluctuating exchange rates, 
only making the problem worse. Yet a further argument in support of fluctuat­
ing exchange rates was that otherwise it would be impossible to lift exchange 
restrictions and free trade for a considerable time since countries were in 
the process of adjustment. And until they had reached equilibrium at the 
higher levels of production and trade to which their policies were directed, 
they would have insufficient reserves to maintain the exchange rate at an 





























































































if the rapid lifting of exchange control was considered of primary importance 
then rather than allow fluctuating exchange rates, some form of additional 
reserves should be found (38).
THE FRITALUX NEGOTIATIONS, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1949
The experts met for the first time in Paris on November 29th and unani­
mously elected Alphand as President of the conference and there the consensus 
ended. If anyone had cherished any illusions that the complementary elements 
in the French and Dutch memoranda could be slotted together and that conces­
sions could then be reached on the more contentious points, they were
/
shattered immediately by the subsequent discussions on the agenda itself. 
Alphand suggested that the primary aim of the group should be to agree on an 
automatic system of exchange rate adjustment. Only then would the French 
government be able to consider measures to liberalize trade and this on the 
condition that it would not cause irreparable damage to existing industries 
and that it was coupled with measures to coordinate the economic, financial 
and social policy of the members of the group. This position was firmly sup­
ported by Grazzi for the Italian delegation. Spierenburg then presented the 
outlines of the Dutch position. In particular he pointed out that the Dutch 
considered that the liberalization of trade should have the highest priority, 
that the UK should be invited and that the Dutch government would not con­
sider cooperating in any group in which West Germany was not a member. It was 
then the turn of Suetens to present the Belgian position and here the Dutch 
could have found themselves immediately isolated since the Belgian delegation 
had arrived at the conference with instructions to make a flexible exchange 




























































































the Dutch the desire to reduce trade barriers and if the agenda was put 
together the way the French and Italians wanted it, the chances were that the 
issue would scarcely be discussed at all. To the relief of the Dutch, Suetens 
did not mention the monetary scheme and directed his opening remarks to sup­
porting Spierenburg's position. Indeed, he went one step further and announced 
that the Belgian government would not consider any relaxation in import quotas 
unless it were accompanied by the reduction of prohibitive tariffs to a level 
which would allow Belgian industry to compete in French and Italian markets 
(see appendix 1). This hit the crux of the matter since it immediately 
transpired that whilst the French and Italians were prepared to discuss quotas 
they had no intention whatever of introducing the tariff question into the 
negotiations. As far as Grazzi was concerned, tariffs were the preserve of 
GATT and were already being discussed in Geneva and Annecy and, anyway, as he 
explained privately to Baraduc, having spent most of his career justifying the 
need for increased trade controls he now had little enthusiasm or conviction 
for doing exactly the opposite (39). Alphand went even further, and argued 
that the MFN clause in GATT prevented the French from taking any initiatives 
on tariffs. Nonetheless he agreed to ask for further instructions on the 
matter. The only matter to reach an acceptable solution on the opening day was 
the question of the UK, whom it was agreed to invite when the eventual nature 
of the group had become clearer. The other matters were referred for dis­
cussion to three separate committees —  one to discuss policy-coordination 
arrangements, one to discuss monetary matters and one to discuss trade.
Within the sub-committee discussing trade very little was achieved. At 
the one extreme the Italians made it clear that they had doubts about the 50 
per cent liberalization to which their government had already agreed within 




























































































the three groups of products (Italy had no import duty for end products). They 
might, however, be willing to increase the quotas for goods which could not be 
freed entirely. The French delegation appear to have been content to allow the 
Italians to make most of the running in those negotiations whilst the Dutch 
appear to have been equally happy for the Belgians to take up the other ex­
treme position. They suggested that each country should immediately liberalize 
60 per cent of their trade (based on 1948) and 100 per cent after six months, 
though a procedure should be established which would determine which (few!) 
products could be exempted. At the same time tariffs had to be reduced. Later 
the Belgians reduced the target to be attained after six months to 80 per cent 
but there the discussions stuck.
The financial sub-committee produced rather more movement in the respec­
tive positions. Before it even met Posthuma and Keesing were successful in 
talking Ansiaux and Vanheurk into abandoning support for flexible exchange 
rates. They conceded the Belgian point that the September rates might not be 
the correct ones and suggested, by way of compromise, that a deficit country 
should, in consultation with the others, be invited to consider a change in 
rates when it had exhausted whatever cover was envisaged in the new multi­
lateral settlement system which the group would set up. This restored unity in 
the Benelux camp but it still left a wide gap in standpoints. In the end the 
Benelux delegates made a further concession to the French —  a currency would 
be allowed to fluctuate by a maximum of 5 per cent (but without affecting 
cross-rates within the group) for a period of one month after which a definite 
revaluation of the currency would take place. The system, however, was not to 
be automatic: a country, if it wished, could maintain a fixed rate of exchange 
(i.e., everyone else could follow the 'crawling peg' principle, the Dutch 




























































































sub-committee eventually produced, however, was one long list of reserved 
positions.
The sub-sub-committee for agriculture was the only other one to get 
something on paper which was nothing less than an agreement in principle to 
form a common agricultural market with a common import and export policy 
against third countries. However the report was careful not to put any 
timetable on when it was to begin or how long the transition period was to 
last, nor did it make any concrete statements on the levels of 
prices/protection. Moreover, the fact that their report still contained a 
provision referring to the Havana-Charter left open the possibility of main­
taining or reintroducing almost any restriction a government wanted (40).
With the experts' discussions in the sub-committees becoming increasingly 
bogged down and having learned informally that ECA officials considered the 
French standpoint on trade 'ridiculous', Spierenburg decided on December 3rd 
to up the stakes. He informed the meeting that it would be impossible to reach 
any agreement unless the French and Italians were willing to agree to three 
conditions
- total trade liberalization by 1951
- 75 per cent trade liberalization by the end of 1950
- the reduction of tariffs to levels to enable competition.
In return he would be prepared to agree to the French standpoint on the 
coordination of economic policy and on investment planning. This stand was 
supported by the other Benelux partners. The onus was now on Alphand to 
prevent the conference from collapsing. The French felt that they could not 
afford to let the discussions fail because of the disastrous consequences that 




























































































reason for setting up the group was to avoid being forced to agree to perhaps 
a greater degree of trade liberalization within OEEC. And a third reason was 
to prevent West Germany, which was adopting a much more liberal policy than 
the French, from taking the lead in Western Europe (41). In view of these 
arguments Alphand agreed to propose to the French government that trade in 
general should be freed provided that some exceptions were allowed. He still 
refused though either to fix a percentage for 1950 or to discuss tariffs. But 
he was prepared to consider forming a free trade area which would get around 
the problem of the most favoured nation clause of GATT, provided once again 
that economic and financial policies were coordinated within the area.
But such concessions were not sufficient to keep the Dutch delegation at 
the Conference. In spite of the Belgian desire to compromise for tactical 
reasons and drop their insistence on 75 percent liberalization by the end of 
1950, the Dutch refused to put their signature to a report which contained so 
many fundamental differences. Instead they asked for the talks to be suspended 
for one week. This threat produced a further compromise from Alphand, designed 
to keep the Dutch at the conference table. He now said that the French delega­
tion would accept seventy-five per cent liberalization in 1950, that the 
coordination of economic and financial policies was no longer a condition for 
this, and that the French would not raise prohibitive tariffs to replace the 
abandoned quotas (though he made no commitment on existing tariffs). But even 
this did not change the Dutch delegation's resolve to discuss the issues with 
the Dutch government before signing the report.
Spierenburg suggested that the Dutch government should authorize the 
negotiators to continue to attend the conference and to work at producing a 
joint report. Where it would be impossible to find acceptable solutions, 




























































































position. The exchange rate agreement was the best he felt could be obtained 
and he warned against torpedoing the conference on this point especially since 
the other delegates seemed to be in favour of it. The task was now, he felt, 
to work for a satisfactory arrangement for the covering of surpluses and 
deficits and which had a good chance of getting some of the $150 million from 
the ECA. But on one point he was firm, the participation of West Germany must 
be assured —  a position which "up to now" had been shaired by the Belgians 
(42). At a hastily convened meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at­
tended by ministers Stikker, van den Brink, Lieftinck and Mansholt and a 
number of senior advisors, Spierenburg's strategy was endorsed, though there 
were serious misgivings about whether tariff reductions were attainable (this 
remained a Dutch condition) and about accepting the French monetary scheme. On 
this latter point the Dutch wanted it made clear that fixed exchange rates 
were the norm, floating exchange rates the exception (43).
That same evening the Benelux partners met to formulate their strategy. 
Ansiaux agreed to work with Keesing on a new text for the financial sub­
committee detailing a scheme for the multilaterization of drawing rights and 
personally to present it to Guindey. Similarly it was the Belgians who agreed 
to front the assault on the Franco-Italian position on tariffs. It was also 
clear from the opening session the following day that Alphand had received new 
instructions. He confirmed that the French were willing to consider moving to 
75 per cent liberalization without making policy coordination a precondition, 
he agreed not to erect new tariffs when quotas were removed (previously the 
position had been not to impose new prohibitive tariffs) and he agreed to 
scrapping any mention of the Havana escape clause in the agricultural report. 
With these concessions from Alphand and the achievement of a more satisfactory 




























































































draft a final experts' report which was to serve as the basis for a conference 
of the Fritalux ministers.
The only item left on the agenda was the question of West Germany. Both 
Belgium and the Netherlands had, in earlier draft reports, stated that West 
German participation was a conditio sine qua non. Now, suddenly and unexpec­
tedly, Suetens announced that Belgium had dropped this condition altogether. 
Apparently Suetens had misinterpreted his instructions —  what the Belgians 
appeared to have been prepared to do was to agree to delay German participa­
tion for six months if this would bring a more positive response from the 
French. As it was the Dutch now found themselves isolated and unable to take 
the strong standpoint which they would have liked. Spierenburg was forced to 
accept in principle that the Dutch would attend the Fritalux Ministers 
Conference, though possibly not before Christmas as Alphand had suggested 
(44).
FRITALUX BECOMES FINEBEL, DECEMBER 1949-FEBRUARY 1950
The experts who had negotiated on and off ever since November 29th had 
other concerns on their minds than just the Fritalux proposals. Having said 
good-bye to each other as Fritalux experts on December 9th, they all met 
together again the following day in a somewhat larger company, this time in 
the context of OEEC negotiations. What they received for their deliberations 
was a note from Richard Bissel outlining an American plan for a clearing union 
in which drawing rights would be multilateralized. At the same time it was 
proposed that the OEEC countries would move towards a still greater 
liberalization of trade. The implications of the Bissel Plan for the Fritalux 




























































































the monetary arrangements still left open and undecided in Fritalux? If the 
sterling area problem were absorbed into an OEEC-wide union, might not Britain 
be prepared to join a more limited group? But if the clearing union were set 
up, would it not be likely that it, and not the Fritalux scheme, would receive 
the ECA dollar aid, so what would be the point of Fritalux then and anyway 
what, once shorn of its monetary component, would it be able to do? On the 
other hand, if the Bissel Plan failed and the Americans began to reassess 
their entire commitment to dollar aid to Europe, might they not then look 
kindly upon the Fritalux plan and shower benificence upon it? The entire 
attitude towards Fritalux changed to one of 'wait and see'. Marjolin explained 
to Hall-Patch that the French were quite divided over Fritalux which he 
claimed was a pet scheme of Alphand's. Marjolin himself felt that Fritalux 
might actually hamper progress within the OEEC whilst he claimed that Petsche 
was very nervous about the whole thing because it raised the awkward question 
of West Germany. All of this meant that the best thing the French could do was 
to put the scheme into cold storage (45). Spierenburg, too, felt that the need 
for speed in deciding on Fritalux had receded but he recognized that it was 
possible that agreement within the OEEC might not be reached in time (the 
Americans wanted it included in the ECA interim report which had to be ready 
by January 15th) and he felt that the intervening time should be used to 
explore, via diplomatic channels, ways of resolving the outstanding issues 
(46).
On December 29th Stikker and Schuman met in Paris to discuss the possible 
future of Fritalux. Central to their deliberations was the question of West 
Germany. Schuman conceded that the solution to European problems was only 
possible if West Germany were included but it was politically impossible for 




























































































discussions to set up the group. Stikker, however, felt that this would be 
unacceptable to the Dutch since Germany's specific problems would require 
special considerations. If Germany required temporary exemptions from certain 
Fritalux provisions, the danger was that other countries would demand conces­
sions from West Germany which it might not be able to accept. In the end it 
was agreed that the Fritalux talks should be resumed but that the group would 
not begin to function without West Germany. On the question of agricultural 
protection, Schuman conceded that the wording of the experts' text which 
stated that quantitative restrictions would be removed 'in principle' and that 
this would procede progressively 'where possible' was plainly ridiculous but 
on the general question of tariffs the standpoints of the two countries were 
as far apart as ever (47). It is worth noting that there was pressure within 
the French cabinet too for the inclusion of West Germany (or Britain) in the 
Fritalux group. Otherwise, as Valay made clear to Bidault, a union with only 
Italy and Benelux would make a nonsense of the French plans to expand agricul­
tural production and exports (48).
On December 30th the financial experts of the OEEC finalized a report 
which went a long way towards meeting the aims of the Bissel Plan and which, 
as far as its thinking on the transferability of European currencies and the 
multilateralization of drawing rights were concerned, went further than the 
Fritalux proposals. After that the delegates of the Fritalux club met infor­
mally to review the situation. Their inclination was that it was still worth 
continuing the monetary discussions since Fritalux had gone further than the 
OEEC on matters of free capital movement, free banknote movements and free 
exchange rates (albeit that the Dutch had reservations on all three points!). 
Posthuma, however, felt that there was little point in doing so bearing in 





























































































all from the $150 million reserve (49). Spierenburg's analysis went even 
further than Posthuma's. He considered that there was nothing left in the 
monetary section of the Fritalux experts' report which could remotely justify 
the formation of a regional group. But, within the OEEC, the Dutch had sin­
gularly failed to link the issue of tariff reduction to that of the reduction 
of quantitative trade restrictions. If within the context of the five 
countries, plus West Germany, spectacular progress could be made in this area 
then such a group (now, symbolically renamed Finebel) could still serve a 
useful function. And should the OEEC plan for a payments union fail, the group 
could still agree to implement it among themselves (50). This position was 
endorsed by cabinet if only because, as argued by van den Brink, it would be 
impolitic for the Dutch to be seen to be the ones to sabotage the 'Fibenel' 
(51) idea or because, as argued by Lieftinck, the Dutch might still need a 
fall-back position should the OEEC initiative fail (52).
French reactions to the OEEC report were mixed. They no longer opposed 
the multilateralization of drawing rights since, although they had been the 
main beneficiary for two years, it was now apparent that they had hardly 
needed them in 1949. But they did object to the decision that OEEC would meet 
on January 28th to discuss the next step in trade liberalization rather than 
waiting, as the French and British had argued, to see the effects of the fifty 
per cent liberalization measures. The option now left open to the French was 
to take the initiative and announce that Finebel was open to any member of 
OEEC interested in abolishing quotas on sixty per cent of private trade im­
mediately and on seventy five per cent by the end of 1950, provided, of 
course, that the other conditions which the French had insisted upon in their 
report were met. But the danger of this proposal was that the French would 




























































































Germany which was totally unacceptable to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
They therefore had to devise a more flexible approach which in view of 
American and OEEC pressure for greater liberalization would still seem spec­
tacular, and would address the problem of state trading which OEEC ignored. 
They also intended to make the calculations on the basis of 1949 trade rather 
than 1948. The scheme was to divide trade into three categories, food and 
agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods. In the first 
category they were prepared to liberalize 90 per cent of private trade so that 
at least 50 per cent of total trade would be liberalized. In the second 
category they were prepared once again to liberalize 90 per cent of private 
trade but only 75 per cent of the third category, manufactured goods. It was 
envisaged that the system would begin on July 1st 1950 (53).
While the financial side of the French proposals was the same as the OEEC 
payments plan, the French felt that Finebel could operate immediately whereas 
the OEEC plan was still only at the project stage, and would not operate until 
July 1st 1950 at the earliest. Not only therefore could Finebel avail itself 
of about 1(30 million dollars from ECA but it could as a group exert con­
siderable influence within OEEC. But as usual the question of West Germany had 
to be settled before anything could be done. While it was recognized that the 
French condition for policy coordination under Finebel would curb the German 
government's freedom of action in economic policy-making, this could not 
remove the risk to the French economy of liberalizing as much trade with 
Germany as with the other members (54).
For these reasons the French were most anxious to arrange a ministerial 
meeting of the Finebel countries on January 26th so that these ideas could be 
presented as a joint initiative. Both the Belgians and the Italians had agreed 





























































































within the OEEC first. They had no objection, however, to a meeting of experts 
on January 19th (55).
The meeting of experts did not get round to discussing the two vital 
issues of tariffs and West German participation since the French argued that 
both matters should be settled at ministerial level. They did agree though to 
support a new French proposal to the OEEC that 60 per cent of trade should be 
liberalized on July 1st (when the new payments scheme was supposed to come 
into operation) and 75 per cent by December 31st: both measures to be condi­
tional upon the ending of discriminatory practices such as dumping and double­
pricing. But they would be supported as French proposals and not submitted as 
a Finebel motion (56). Keesing felt the French were still against both the 
participation of West Germany and the lowering of tariffs. Indeed he felt that 
the French were trying to arrange an honourable burial for Finebel since it 
raised too many problems and since the Americans apparently did not consider 
that it went far enough to justify getting any dollars. What better way to 
bury it than to have the whole OEEC accept the liberalization measures which 
the Finebel countries had agreed among themselves? (57)
Things did not turn out that way at all. The Council of the OEEC did not 
accept the French proposals nor did it agree to the implementation of a 
European payments union. The isolated opposition of Stafford Cripps seemed to 
make further progress impossible. The Americans, in desperation, now started 
running in different directions hoping to find a solution to bring before 
Congress. Within ECA it was the view of Bissel that setting up Finebel did not 
constitute a solution. For a start it was too small and would engage the time 
of those experts who needed to be working on the wider European Payments 
Union. But this criticism contradicted and greatly embarrassed Hoffmann and 





























































































form of integration (58). Unwilling to let West Germany become a stumbling 
block to Finebel or Uniskan, Hoffman argued that it could participate in both. 
But at the same time he told Petsche that he wanted Finebel to become a little 
European clearing union. In reviewing the options Guindey wondered whether the 
best approach might not be to set Finebel up immediately. This would probably 
be too much for the newly-formed Italian government, but if they left the 
group, this might leave the door open for Switzerland, whom Belgium wanted as 
a partner. And indeed a group composed of France, Benelux and Switzerland was 
very attractive to Guindey (59).
The Dutch cabinet also met to consider its position for a Finebel minis­
terial meeting which had been scheduled for February 9th. Given the prospect 
that the Americans would be willing to provide a satisfactory regional group 
with dollar support, Finebel became an attractive proposition once more if it 
included West Germany arid if the tariff question were resolved. What should, 
however, be made clear was that the group was open to any country willing to 
adhere to it and that if and when the OEEC agreed to similar measures, Finebel 
would be allowed to lapse (60).
On February 9th the long sought for Finebel ministerial meeting took 
place. Schneiter (standing in for Schuman) opened the meeting by stressing the 
need for some speedy action —  the Americans wanted some tangible results in 
the area of European economic cooperation which they could show to Congress. 
Whilst he sympathized with the need to include West Germany, he felt that the 
creation of such a trade preference area might alarm the British, who would 
see it as a continental bloc aimed against them, and that this might per­
manently damage any chance of Britain joining a payments union. Van Zeeland 




























































































Germany would obviously raise complications, the Belgian government was will­
ing to participate in a group which, in the first instance, was confined to 
France, Benelux and Italy. Stikker was now completely isolated on the German 
issue and rather than continue pressing it, he changed tack and questioned 
whether Finebel, without West Germany, was really what the Americans wanted. 
Besides which, he asked, were the measures which the group might take spec­
tacular enough to attract dollar aid and, bearing in mind the list of 
unresolved points in the Experts' Report of December 1949, could the Finebel 
countries deliver results in time? Schneiter replied that it was possible that 
the Americans would prefer a group without West Germany since it would be 
cheaper in terms of the dollar support it needed and as for the points still 
open, he felt that they could be resolved. This still left open the question 
of whether the Americans would supply the group with dollars. Van Zeeland then 
proposed a dramatically simple suggestion which prevented the meeting getting 
completely out of hand. Firstly, why not ask the Americans if they were will­
ing to supply the dollars to cover the deficit within the group caused by the 
inclusion of West Germany and secondly, if British objections to the inclusion 
of West Germany were an obstacle, why not ask them if they objected or not? He 
then asked Schneiter if the French would be willing to accept West Germany as 
a partner if these two conditions were met, to which he replied affirmatively. 
He then committed the Belgians to participation in Finebel, without West 
Germany, if either of the conditions were not met, a standpoint which was also 
taken by Luxembourg and Italy. Stikker reserved the Dutch standpoint, but 
agreed to talk with the British and Americans (61).
The interesting question raised by this meeting is whether French policy 
vis-à-vis the inclusion of West Germany had really changed, whether Schneiter,




























































































or whether he knew before agreeing to the conditions, that one of them would 
not be met. There is some suggestion in the archives that the latter might 
indeed have been the case but more research is needed before it can be proved 
one way or the other. Before the meeting had taken place, Stafford Cripps had 
contacted Petsche to persuade him not to permit the inclusion of West Germany 
in Finebel. He argued that West Germany should not belong to any regional 
group be it Uniskan or Finebel until it had been discussed by the occupying 
powers. To this Petsche had agreed that if the Dutch continued to press for 
West German inclusion, Finebel would not be formed (62). The Dutch ambassador 
in Paris reported that Schneiter had told him of a similar conversation be-
I
tween himself and Bevin. Since the talks between the two were supposed to have 
been chiefly about Indochina, the ambassador wondered whether a deal might not 
have been made between the two (63).
At the same time opposition to Finebel within the French government was 
increasing. In a note from the Service de Coopération-Economique within the 
Quai d'Orsay, on February 10th 1950 all the arguments about French economic 
backwardness and need for investment, which had been exposed at length in 
successive planning documents, were repeated. But if the plan had taken 
initially 1950 and subsequently 1952 as the date by which the French economy 
would be exposed to international competition, this was not the view of this 
section of the Quai d'Orsay. Trade liberalization it was felt would lead to 
the control by large American companies of the European economy. It was argued 
that the experience of Marshall Aid had shown that it was only large French 
companies which had close links with the United States which were able to 
reequip with Marshall Aid. If controls on trade and payments were dropped then 
American capital would flood into Europe transforming European production into 




























































































prices and unemployment. The alternative was to reduce dollar purchases, not 
by cooperating with countries such as Belgium and West Germany which were 
making no effort in this direction, but by maintaining controls and directing 
trade towards the sterling area and Eastern Europe whose economies were com­
plementary to the French. At the same time the investment effort could 
continue leading to an increase in productivity, and real wages if profits 
were reduced. An additional reason for ruling out French participation in a 
western European group was the fact that before the war France had a chronic 
trade deficit with the countries concerned which it was felt was bound to 
persist (64).
While waiting for Stikker to report back the Finebel experts had another 
meeting on February 15th 1950 to modify their report of December 9th 1949, so 
that it could be published. It was now written into the report that member 
governments would make their decisions on West German membership within a 
short time, since apart from the Netherlands government no one had a firm 
position. On issues of general policy it was agreed to harmonize budgetary, 
credit, fiscal, social and investment policies. But it was recognized that 
since much investment, and an increasing amount in most countries, was not 
under government control, any coordination would have to be done by private 
agreements between producers, both industrial and agricultural, and between 
private banks. On the question of the free movement of labour which had not 
been settled in December, it was now felt to be desirable if the economies 
were to be unified but the Dutch, fearful of two million unemployed Italians 
flooding the Dutch market, said that this right should only be given to those 
made unemployed as a result of integration. Agreement was also reached on the 
need to eliminate double pricing and dumping practices. In financial matters 




























































































for the group. If the Americans did not provide sufficient dollars for the 
reserve fund, and Harrirnan's comment that day that Finebel. should be put on 
ice implied this, then the group was to accept second category payments and 
not impose bilateral ceilings. The system for capital movements was to be 
equally flexible. Provided the balance of trade allowed it, there were to be 
no restrictions on either the export of capital or the free movement of 
banknotes. But it was in the area of trade liberalization that agreement 
proved most elusive, and experts had to settle for an intention to consult on 
the problems caused by the coexistence of state and private trading. The 
French and the Italian refused to allow Benelux any compensation for the fact 
that it had abolished quotas on ninety per cent of its trade, insisting that 
the same, agreed percentage had to apply to each member country. Nor would the 
group agree to the Belgian proposal to put agricultural and finished products 
in one group. The experts report was published on February 16th 1950 (65).
The following day the considered reply of Britain to the conversations 
with Stikker arrived. But if the Dutch had hoped for a clear opinion or lead 
from Britain, they were disappointed. On the one hand the British requested 
time to consider the major issues raised by the possible participation of West 
Germany in Finebel but on the other hand they claimed that the whole question 
of Finebel was superfluous in view of the impending decision to set up a 
European payments union (66). Bevin's fear was as he told Acheson that if a 
limited payments scheme were set up it could be the first step towards a 
permanent division between the Sterling Area and perhaps Scandinavia, and the 
Finebel countries. He also considered it premature to take a decision on West 
Germany in the context of Finebel before the entire German problem was 
reviewed by the three powers in the spring (67). This did not prevent the 




























































































February 17th to join a sterling transferable account system (68). In the 
circumstances it seemed to all concerned that the best line of action was to 
press Britain to come up with its plan for a European payments union by March 
9th 1950, and to put Finebel on ice until then.
But Acheson made it quite clear to Bevin that the decision to set up a 
European Payments Union or failing that, Finebel, could not wait for the 
outcome of the three power discussion on Germany (69). And three days later 
ECA gave positive encouragement to Finebel by promising to supply it with 
dollars, if indeed they were necessary, up to June 30th 1950 when the wider 
payments union was to come into operation. They expressed no opinion on the 
participation of West Germany in the group since the main attraction to ECA 
was if the group could operate immediately, and presumably put pressure on 
Britain to produce a scheme for a European Payments Union (70). But this new 
support and promise of dollars did not change the Dutch position. Since it had 
been established that even with the participation of West Germany, the 
Netherlands would continue to be a universal debtor within the group, Dutch 
enthusiasm for Finebel, feeble as it was, waned completely. Moreover, the 
Dutch had got little closer to achieving any concrete commitments on the 
question of tariff concessions which might have helped ease this position. 
Nor, as Stikker informed cabinet, did they seem likely to. The annual round of 
trade negotiations with France and Italy had run into difficulty. They were 
not, he complained, being conducted in the 'spirit of Finebel' (71). As 
Hirschfeld told Alphand on February 27th the Dutch wanted to wait and see what 
happened in OEEC rather than push ahead with Finebel (72).
The decision was a wise one in view of all the vacillations of American 
policy. At a meeting in Washington on March 1st between Acheson, Hoffmann, 




























































































which he had discussed with Bevin and Cripps both British plans for a European 
Payments Union and Finebel. He found Bevin more actively interested than 
Cripps in an EPU and thus more strongly opposed to Finebel. With Bevin promis­
ing a plan in a couple of weeks Acheson and Harriman agreed that Finebel 
should be put back on ice for three weeks or so (73). When Cripps handed 
Harriman the British plan on March 7th it certainly did not measure up to 
American expectations and requirements. Britain was to retain a special status 
within the payments union and maintain its bilateral trade and payments ar­
rangements with individual countries. It was also to retain the right to 
reimpose quotas on imports from OEEC countries if this was deemed necessary to 
protect its monetary reserves. But this disappointment was not enough to put 
life back into Finebel. Indeed, the following day Guindey expressed interest 
in joining the British inspired Uniskan scheme (74).
CONCLUSIONS
The Finebel discussions were never formally terminated, they simply 
failed to take place any longer. In subsequent histories of the period they 
have gradually slipped into the footnotes, usually accompanied by some 
humourous remark because of their rather silly sounding names (75). However, 
if all the various elements in all the various proposals are pooled together, 
they offer the following blue-print for European cooperation:
- a regional block consisting of Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, 
Italy and The Netherlands
- the abolition of quantitative trade restrictions on 90 per cent of 




























































































trade in manufactures within the group by July 1st 1950 —  with 
presumably more to follow
- the abolition of prohibitive tariff barriers on intra-group trade and 
the lowering of others
- the removal of discriminatory fiscal practices and other administrative 
measures which distorted competition between group members
- the eventual establishment of a common market in agriculture
- the introduction of a qualified system of exchange rate flexibility to 
help correct imbalances on intra-group payments movements
- the rapid transition to full convertibility of currencies within the 
group
- a harmonization of national budgetary, credit and social policies
- the coordination of investment in industry and agriculture to promote 
economies of scale and exports to third markets
- the gradual introduction of free movement of labour within the group.
Admittedly a number of these elements were no more than statements of 
intent, but that was equally true of other international agreements, including 
the Treaty of Rome. The Dutch would probably have been willing to go along 
with such an arrangement though their commitment to exchange-rate flexibility 
was less than tepid (they had reserved the right not to apply it to their own 
currency). However they would probably have wanted more definite arrangements 
on the question of tariff reductions, especially if they were to remove other 
trade barriers. The two issues were linked in Dutch foreign economic policy —  
the country was already in chronic balance of payments deficit, it had lost 
its freedom of policy on the tariff front when it had adopted the (low) 




























































































line of defence in the form of non-tariff barriers it expected a quid-pro-quo 
on the tariff front from high tariff countries. This was a line of policy it 
followed consistently through the EPU negotiations within the OEEC (76). 
Moreover West German participation in the group was an absolute condition. The 
Dutch had been working long and hard to obtain a satisfactory trade treaty 
with West Germany and had finally succeeded in the Autumn of 1949 (77). The 
effect was to transform a large payments deficit into a large surplus and that 
surplus was the only thing which made their overall balance within the group 
tolerable (see Appendix 2 Tables). Without that the Dutch would have been 
forced very early to deflate or to run down reserves or to get out.
It was not likely to have been very easy for suitable agreements to have 
been made on tariffs. The Italians were dead set against any open-ended com­
mitment on their part and the French were not particularly keen either —  and 
certainly not if the group were to have contained West Germany. Indeed the 
Dutch ambassador in Rome had heard from an unimpeachable source that during 
the November/December negotiations 'an agreement had been made, whereby Italy 
would side with the French on the question of West Germany's participation in 
Fritalux; against this France would support Italian demands to cut back the 
Dutch proposals (75 per cent liberalization, lowering import duties etc.) 
which have clearly shaken the Italians' (78). The pattern of settlements 
between France and West Germany was in deficit right up to the last quarter of 
1949 (though only the last two quarters of 1949 are given in the Appendix) and 
the turn around in the first quarter of 1950 was attributable more to the one­
sided liberalization of West Germany's imports and a general deterioration in 
the West German balance of payments than to any inherent improvement in 
France's competitive position. Any across the board trade liberalization and 




























































































concern not only for France's credit position within the group but also for 
the continued viability of certain manufacturing industries. Yet without West 
German participation there would be no Dutch participation and without Dutch 
participation there would be no Benelux participation and without that, there 
was not really much of a regional group left over.
What the French, therefore, had to find was a means for including West 
Germany in a regional group whilst at the same time making it attractive for 
the others and, at the same time again, neutralizing the damaging effects on 


































































































Benelux France Germany Italy AVERAGE
Products 6.5 24.0 17.5 32.0 18.5
Paper 15.0 25.0 14.0 22.5 16.5
Chemicals 7.0 15.0 24.0 17.0 13.0
Rubber 24.0 14.0 25.0 24.0 19.0
Metals
Textile
6.0 12.0 13.0 22.0 10.0
Products 13.0 16.0 20.0 24.0 16.0
Textile 
Machine Trans
2.0 — 4.5 1.0
ports 10.0 17.0 15.0 28.0 15.0
Coal - - - 6.5 1.5
AVERAGE 7.0 17.0 14.0 19.0 13.0
Note: 1) Specific duties have been calculated as a percentage on the basis of 
1951 prices
2) The various duties are weighted on the basis of the composition of
imports in 1951
3) Although this procedure might create specific distortions compared 
with the same procedure applied to 1949 and 1950 the overall pattern 
is unlikely to have been substantially different































































































NET DOLLAR BALANCES IN THE FRITALUX/FINEBEL GROUP AND WEST GERMANY 1949/1950
Note: 1. These figures refer to the balances of payments movements in the 
widest sense of the term. They embrace loans and loan repayment
transactions.
2. The data refers only to dollar transactions taking place via the
Intra-European Payments and Compensations Agreements. They do not 
include payments in gold or in non—dollar currencies nor do they
include payments through bilateral clearing and drawing rights
agreements.
European Payments and Compensations. Surpluses and Deficits for the period 
1.7.1949-18.9.1949 (000$)
TABLE 1
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS
BLEU +18735 -127 -34808
FRANCE -18735 +7870 -11899
ITALY +127 -7870 -51
NETHERLANDS +34808 +11899 + 51
TOTAL
'FRITALUX' +16200 +22764 +7794 -46748
. TABLE 2
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS W GERMANY
BLEU +18735 -127 -34808 -26824
FRANCE -18735 +7870 -11899 -11899
ITALY + 127 -7870 . -51 +3730
NETHERLANDS +34808 +11899 + 51 -1108
W.GERMANY 
TOTAL
+26824 -17031 -3730 +1108
'FRITALUX'
+ W.GERMANY +43024 +5733 +4064 -45640 -7171
Source: B.I.S. Agreements for Intra-European Payments and Compensations.




























































































European Payments and Compensations Surpluses and Deficits for the period 
19.9.1949-31.12.1949 (000$)
TABLE 3
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS
BLEU +10312 -6907 -4833
FRANCE -10312 +14931 +2433




'FRITALUX1 +1428 -7052 +7791 -2167
TABLE 4
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS W GERMANY
BLEU +10312 -6907 -4833 -7001
FRANCE -10312 +14931 +2433 + 7049
ITALY +6907 -14931 +233 +343
NETHERLANDS +4833 -2433 -233 -59388
W.GERMANY 
TOTAL
+7001 -7049 -343 +59388
'FRITALUX'
+ W.GERMANY +8427 -14101 +7448 +57221 -58997
Source B.I.S. Agreements for Intra-European Payments and Compensations. 




























































































European Payments and Compensations Surpluses and Deficits for the period 
1.1.1950-31.3.1950 (000 $)
TABLE 5
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS
BLEU -13895 -11146 -49243
FRANCE +13895 +11008 + 67




'FRITALUX' +74284 -24970 -224 -49090
TABLE 6
BLEU FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS W GERMANY
BLEU -13895 -11146 -49243 -4775
FRANCE +13895 +11008 +67 -19457
ITALY +11146 -11008 +86 -2421
NETHERLANDS +49243 -67 -86 -38308
W.GERMANY 
TOTAL
+4775 +19457 +2421 +38308
'FRITALUX' 
+W.GERMANY +79059 -5513 +2197 -10782 -64961
Source: B.I.S. Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compensations. Report 





























































































*We would like to thank drs. Anjo G. Harryvan for his help as research 
assistant in helping to bring this paper about.
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The French archives used for this paper were:
- the archives of the Secrétariat Général Interministériel pour les 
questions de Coopération Economique Européenne (SGCICEE). This was a 
governmental committee set up in June 1948 which brought together those 
ministers and civil, servants involved in formulating policy for 
European cooperation and the utilization of Marshall Aid. The archives, 
which are only available with special permission, are located in the 
Section Contemporaine of the Archives Nationales under the provisional 
classification (AN) F60 BIS;
- the archives of the European section of the Ministère des Relations 
Extérieures. Once again these archives were available with special 
permission under the provisional classification Série CE Europe 
(prefixed in the notes by A.D. (archives diplomatiques));
- the archives of the first French plan in the Archives Nationales under 
the classification Série 80 A.J.
The Dutch archives used for this paper were:
- the Ministerraad archief. This archive contains the minutes of the 
meetings of the full cabinet (ministerraad) and the cabinet economic 
committee (Raad voor Economische Aangelegenheden) and after January 1st 
1950 the discussion papers. They are located in the Algemene 
Rijksarchief. They are referred to in the notes under the abbreviation 
ARA, MR;
- the cabinet archive of the Ministry of General Affairs (Ministerie van 
Algemene Zaken - a portfolio held automatically by the Prime Minister) 
which contains the cabinet discussion papers for the period before 
January 1st 1950. They are referred to in the notes under the abbrevia­
tion Min. AZ, Kabinet;
- the archive of the foreign -payments section (Buitenlandse 
Betalingsverkeer) in the Ministry of Finance, abbreviated in the notes 
to Min. Fin., BBV;
- the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken). The sections consulted were the general departmen­
tal archive, abbreviated to Min. BZ, Dept., the secret document 
(geheime stukken) section of the same, abbreviated to Min. BZ., GS and 
the archive of the Directoraat-Generaal voor het Economisch en Militair 
Hulpprogramma which was the bureau set up by Hirschfeld and which 
concerned itself inter alia with Marshall Aid and all the subsequent 





























































































The Bri tish archives used were ali in the Public Records Office, London 
in the files of the Treasury and the Foreign Office. They are abbreviated in 
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